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I. Introduction
{1} Popularly known as cyberspace, the Internet continues to evolve and expand, keeping pace with the lives
of its users as a complex communications network. Many people rely on the Internet, an intricate link of
numerous computers and computer networks, as a research and communications tool. The Internet is a
"decentralized, global medium of communications--or 'cyberspace'--that links people, institutions,
corporations, and governments around the world."[1] No single entity owns the Internet, but the individual
computers that compose the Internet are owned by various individuals, governmental, public and private
organizations and institutions.[2] The Internet cannot have a main control center nor can any single entity
monopolize the abundant variety of information freely accessible on the Internet;[3] however, the finite
computer networks that comprise the Internet are intertwined in a manner which permits a computer linked to
the Internet to interact with other computers linked to the Internet. This interconnection among computers
and computer networks is the means by which the rapid exchange of electronic information can occur.[4]
{2} People who seek access to the Internet may obtain membership from a number of Internet service
providers ("ISPs") such as America Online, CompuServe, Prodigy, and other local ISPs. These Internet
service providers offer membership based on a flat monthly or yearly fee or on an hourly rate. In recent years,
most, if not all, members choose to pay the flat monthly or yearly rate in light of their extensive use of the
Internet.[5] After an individual purchases access from an ISP, that individual may use the Internet to
communicate with another individual who has Internet access via electronic mail, more commonly known as
"e-mail". E-mail communication "occur[s] almost instantaneously, and can be directed either to specific
individuals, to a broader group of people interested in a particular subject, or to the world as a whole."[6]
Users of the Internet range from government officials to children.
{3} As a new method of communication develops, it undeniably creates an additional channel through which
unsolicited commercial advertisements can be sent. E-mail has provided businesses with an attractive avenue
with which to advertise their products and services.[7] These advertisements, referred to as "junk e-mail" or
"spam,"[8] have enraged many who communicate via e-mail. Spam is "increasing at an exponential rate."[9]
Businesses incur minimal cost through mass e-mail advertisements because Internet users are not charged for
the amount of information they send.[10] Bulk e-mailing takes only minutes to complete, and the
advertisements are transmitted to the recipients' electronic mail boxes almost instantaneously, regardless of
geographical location. This method of advertising is faster and cheaper than any other means of cold
advertising, including door-to-door, phone, and postal mail solicitations. For those reasons, many businesses
have an interest in protecting their alleged right to send unsolicited e-mail advertisements to Internet users.
Their persistence is evident in several cases that have been filed by Internet service providers against
spammers.[11]
{4} Unsolicited e-mail advertisements[12] may be annoying to some Internet users but whether this practice
can be legally restricted or regulated has yet to be determined. This discussion may trigger free speech
concerns. Many spammers assert freedom of speech as a defense. Notwithstanding the free speech defense,
many Internet service providers have been successful in their fight against spammers. Part II of this paper
discusses the standard of judicial scrutiny that the courts have applied in free speech cases and assesses
whether a restriction of unsolicited advertisements via e-mail encroaches upon this fundamental right. Part III
examines two other possible defenses that spammers may employ to protect their challenged right to send
unsolicited e-mail. Part IV analyzes cases and complaints seeking redress against unsolicited e-mail
advertisements. Part V evaluates both state and federal legislative developments that have occurred in
response to spam-related litigation. Part VI presents the legal theories which have been most successful in
obtaining judgments against spammers, in light of the judicial and legislative developments presented in Parts
IV and V. Part VII proposes a recommendation for the future development of the law governing unsolicited e-
mail advertisements. Finally, Part VIII concludes with a prediction of the direction in which the law is
developing.
II. Judicial Scrutiny Applicable To Free Speech Cases
A. "Commercial Speech" Is Not an Exception To the First Amendment
{5} Freedom of speech traditionally has been viewed "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."[13] In 1942, when the United States
Supreme Court first confronted a restriction of purely commercial speech, the Court asserted that "[w]e are . .
. clear that the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial
advertising."[14] After 1951, the Court veered away from denying protection under the First Amendment[15]
when the nature of the speech was purely commercial.[16] In 1976, however, the Supreme Court explicitly
declared that "commercial speech, like other varieties of speech, is protected"[17] under the First Amendment
of United States Constitution.
B. The Central Hudson/Fox Standard of Scrutiny
{6} Although the United States Supreme Court acknowledges that commercial speech is a freedom
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, the Court grants less protection to commercial speech than non-
commercial speech.[18] In 1980, the Court established an intermediate level of scrutiny in reviewing
government regulations that restrict commercial speech.[19] Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission[20] developed a four-pronged test to determine whether commercial speech has been
unconstitutionally restricted. Governmental regulation of commercial speech is valid if the following factors
are present: (1) the speech concerns an unlawful activity and is misleading; (2) the asserted governmental
interest is substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) the
regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.[21] Not all of the factors, however, are needed for the
regulation to be valid.[22] In complying with the requirements of intermediate scrutiny, the government has
to show that spamming causes actual harm and that the government regulation "will in fact alleviate the real
harm to a material degree."[23] The government regulation, however, does not have "to be the least
restrictive means available; rather, there [only needs to] be a 'reasonable fit' between the government interest
and the regulation."[24]
C. The Intermediate Standard as Applied to Mail, Door-to-Door, Phone, and Fax Solicitations
{7} In determining whether to restrict unsolicited communications, courts have sought to balance the right to
freedom of speech with an individual's right to privacy. The United States Supreme Court has been hesitant to
allow governmental regulation of advertisements sent through the U.S. mail. The only regulation that has
withstood judicial scrutiny is one in which the government granted recipients the choice of blocking
unsolicited mail advertisements.[25] Door-to-door solicitations face a more stringent regulation because of
their greater encroachment on the recipient's privacy; therefore, statutes may require that the solicitation
occur at a reasonable time, place, and manner.[26] Phone solicitations have been subject to the most
government interference. Not only does the law require telemarketers to identify themselves, to allow
recipients to decline the communication, and to restrict calls to reasonable times,[27] but federal regulations
prohibit artificial or prerecorded telephone solicitations.[28]
{8} The most striking ban on commercial speech to pass judicial muster targets unsolicited advertisements
via facsimile machines. Section 227(b)(1)(C) of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 ("TCPA")
explicitly states that no "telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device [can be used] to send an
unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine."[29] In Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. Federal
Communications Commission,[30] several businesses that wanted to advertise via facsimile machine and
several businessmen who wanted to continue receiving fax solicitations challenged the constitutionality of
this provision of the TCPA. Those plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin the enforcement of this section of
the TCPA based on their contention that the section violated their freedom of speech. Applying the
intermediate level of scrutiny, the court upheld the constitutionality of the TCPA.[31]
D. The Intermediate Standard as Applied to Electronic Mail
1. Spamming and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
{9} One proposed theory for eliminating spam from the Internet is to include it in the stark prohibition
against fax solicitation, provided for in section 227(b)(1)(C) of the TCPA and upheld in Destination Ventures,
Ltd. v. Federal Communications Commission, discussed above. This argument is not sound. In Destination
Ventures, the court found that section 277(b)(1)(C) of the TCPA directly advanced (and was narrowly tailored
to fit) the government's substantial interest in preventing the cost of advertising from being unfairly shifted
from the sender to the recipient; it also prevents desired business messages from being impeded.[32] This
raises the question of whether these two government interests apply when a person sends unsolicited
commercial advertisements via e-mail.
{10} To fully examine the possible application of the TCPA to unsolicited e-mails, an assumption must be
made that the TCPA encompasses such advertisements. Even if that assumption is made, the government
must jump over the constitutional hurdle and show that the government interests expressed in Destination
Ventures also apply to unsolicited e-mails before the government is able to impose such a strict regulation.
The argument that spammers are shifting the cost of advertising to recipients is strengthened if ISP
subscribers are charged in hourly increments for Internet access. In such a case, there is an element of cost-
shifting because subscribers have to pay for the time that it takes them to shuffle through, read, and delete
"junk e-mail."
{11} Although most commercial online computer services permit their subscribers to pay incrementally, the
overwhelming majority choose to pay a more competitive monthly rate for Internet access.[33] As such,
recipients "incur no marginal cost . . . for the time it takes them to throw out the spam."[34] Even if the
government could successfully argue that the cost of advertising is being shifted to ISPs (because the receipt
of mass electronic mail messages burdens the servers[35] and drains the resources of Internet service
providers),[36] the question remains whether those ISPs are "recipients" of the advertisement as the term is
used in Destination Ventures, Ltd. The court in Destination Ventures upheld the constitutionality of a
complete ban on soliciting via facsimile, in part, because the cost of such advertising is shifted to the
"unwitting customer."[37] An argument could be made that the recipients of the advertisement are the
potential consumers (the subscribers of the ISPs), not the ISPs themselves.
{12} In addition, although a facsimile machine cannot process another message while it is printing an
incoming one, a computer has the capability to process and store numerous e-mail messages simultaneously.
Internet service providers contend that the large volume of "junk e-mail" occupies a substantial amount of
disk space and exhausts the processing power of their computer equipment.[38] This may place a burden on
an ISP's equipment and delay the delivery of e-mails, but the problem has not reached the magnitude of
"thwart[ing] the receipt of legitimate and important messages."[39] Local ISPs, however, could have smaller
storing capacity and the burden of storing and processing spam could hamper the computer system's ability to
store and process other e-mail. If the volume of mass e-mail explodes, it potentially could reach a point where
legitimate messages might be thwarted because no ISP has infinite storing capacity. Based on present
allegations, however, a solid argument cannot be made that either of the harms used to justify the enactment
of section 277(b)(1)(C) of the TCPA are present with respect to unsolicited e-mails. Interpretation of this
statute to include electronic mail may, therefore, be an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of speech.
{13} As stated previously, the above discussion is based on the assumption that the government has imposed
a restriction on unsolicited e-mail advertisements. Congress, however, has never indicated the intent to
expand the federal prohibitions of the TCPA to include electronic mail. The actual text of the statute targets
unsolicited advertisements via the telephone system, but extending the prohibition to include e-mails would
exceed the original meaning and intent of the TCPA. Congress could have used the phrase "electronic
communications," which it has used in previous federal statutes, in place of the chosen phrase "telephone
facsimile machine"[40] to include both fax machines and computer transmitted e-mails. The failure of
Congress to do so indicates that "Congress had a very specific type of nuisance in mind."[41] Congress made
a further distinction between a computer and a fax machine by prohibiting the use of a computer to send
advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine.[42] Accordingly, the argument in favor of the inclusion of
electronic mail under the fax prohibition lacks support.
2. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.[43]
{14} Spammers like Sanford Wallace, also known as the "Spam King" and president of Cyber Promotions,
Inc. ("Cyber Promotions"),[44] defend their actions by asserting their right to freedom of speech.[45] That
defense, however, has been rejected by two different courts. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania rejected a freedom of speech defense in Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online,
Inc.[46] Cyber Promotions had been sending unsolicited commercial advertisements via e-mail to America
Online, Inc. ("AOL") subscribers, who made numerous complaints with regard to Cyber Promotions' actions.
[47] As a result, AOL informed Cyber Promotions that it wanted the solicitations to cease.[48] When the e-
mail persisted, AOL filtered and collected all of the unsolicited e-mail and returned them in bulk to Cyber
Promotions' ISP.[49] Cyber Promotions filed a complaint in response to AOL's actions, requesting that the
court grant it the right to continue sending unsolicited e-mail advertisements and to enjoin AOL from
blocking the receipt of such e-mail messages.[50] The court, finding that AOL was not a state actor nor a
public utility, held that Cyber Promotions' actions did not invoke the protection of the First Amendment and
granted AOL a partial summary judgment on this issue.[51]
3. CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.
{15} After the district court's decision in 1996, Cyber Promotions moved on to the next ISP. CompuServe
Inc.. ("CompuServe") in CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,[52] found itself in a similar position to
AOL. Many of CompuServe's subscribers, who pay incrementally for their service, wanted to terminate their
enrollment and to purchase access from another ISP to avoid the annoyance of unsolicited e-mails.[53]
CompuServe subsequently prohibited Cyber Promotions from sending any further mailings of unsolicited
advertisements to CompuServe subscribers. Cyber Promotions, however, ignored CompuServe's request.
CompuServe then installed a filtration software to screen out all unsolicited e-mails. Nonetheless, Cyber
Promotions was able to alter its spams to evade the screening software installed by CompuServe.
{16} As a result, CompuServe sought to have Cyber Promotions's advertising methods declared a trespass to
chattels. Cyber Promotions again claimed protection under freedom of speech. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, however, rejected Cyber Promotions' free speech argument and
granted CompuServe a preliminary injunction.[54]
4. First Amendment Defense
{17} Generally, spammers have defended their actions by asserting their right to freedom of speech. To
invoke the protection of the First Amendment, however, a business's freedom of speech has to be restricted
by a governmental entity.[55] Internet service providers such as AOL and CompuServe are not state actors;
[56] they are private companies. As such, these ISPs have the right to restrict access to their property by use
of any legal means available. For example, Internet service providers may employ blocking[57] or
filtration[58] devices to prevent their members from receiving unsolicited electronic mail messages.
{18} A private actor, however, may be viewed as a state actor under two situations. First, the private actor has
to perform an exclusive public function.[59] In CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., Cyber
Promotions alleged that CompuServe, by providing Internet e-mail service to its subscribers, was acting as a
postmaster,[60] which is a function that has been performed traditionally by the state. This argument,
however, is attenuated at best because the state does not have the exclusive prerogative, ability, nor interest to
furnish all of its constituents with Internet access. As previously stated, the Internet has been determined to
be a decentralized mode of communication.[61] Unlike the United Stated Postal Service, Internet e-mail
service is not provided by any one entity.[62] Furthermore, e-mail service is not readily accessible to the
general public because only a portion of society owns a computer or has access to one that is capable of
sending and receiving e-mail messages. In addition, only a portion of those with Internet service actually use
electronic mail as a means of communication.
{19} To prevail on the argument that Internet service providers are performing an exclusive public function,
solicitors must show that Internet service providers are "performing the full spectrum of municipal powers
and [is standing] in the shoes of the State."[63] The court in Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.
proclaimed that by supplying the public with access to the Internet, the ISP was neither executing any
municipal powers nor standing in the shoes of the state.[64] The same proclamation can be applied to almost
all other Internet service providers, which are in a position nearly identical to that of AOL's. Internet service
providers may gain a higher probability of being depicted as standing in the shoes of the state if "the network
. . . assume[s] a wider variety of [state] attributes."[65] Even if the government began using the network to
perform traditional state functions, such as providing methods for their constituents to cast votes, the courts
would not likely scrutinize an online service provider as a state actor because it merely furnishes the means
which allows the government to perform a state function. CompuServe has not performed an exclusive public
function that would change its status from a private actor to a state actor.
{20} Secondly, for a private entity to be viewed as a state actor, it has to become entangled with a state actor.
The entanglement argument has two prongs, neither of which has any direct bearing on Internet service
providers. The first question the courts ask is whether state officials have helped or acted in concert with an
ISP in providing Internet access service.[66] The courts then consider whether states and Internet service
providers are interdependent entities, thereby making them joint participants in the service of providing
Internet access to the public.[67] Courts that have addressed these questions have answered them in the
negative.[68]
{21} The government only has a minor and indirect connection to Internet service providers such as AOL and
CompuServe. Although the government has allowed its computers and computer networks to be linked with
the Internet, "the government apparently does not plan to operate the networks."[69] In fact, government
literature emphasizes that "'[t]he private sector will lead the deployment of the [National Information
Infrastructure] and 'the private sector role in NII development will predominate.'"[70] The government has
not influenced nor been involved in the business decisions of these ISPs. The court in America Online, Inc.
held that the lack of participation was sufficient in declaring that the government was not a joint participant.
[71] Furthermore, although some ISPs have sought the aid of federal courts, the simple fact that a suit has
been filed in federal court does not signify involvement with a state actor.[72] For a private and state actor to
be intertwined so that their division is not distinguishable, the state actor has to be intimately involved with
the activities of the private actor. The peripheral role of the government with respect to Internet service and
access does not amount to entanglement or interdependence.
{22} Assume, however, the spammers prevailed in showing that Internet service providers are state actors
and any restrictions on spamming, either by use of filtration/blocking software or by order of an injunction,
amounts to a form of governmental regulation.[73] Nonetheless, First Amendment guarantees are not
absolute. A business does not have an inviolable right to commercial speech.[74] Businesses do not have the
right to demand acceptance of their advertisements by everyone to whom the advertisements are sent. "[The]
mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee . . . . To hold less would
be to license a form of trespass..."[75] Numerous complaints from subscribers indicate that many are
unhappy receiving the unsolicited electronic mail advertisements. Subscribers have threatened to end their
enrollment if the spamming does not stop.[76] Therefore, before a court can declare a business has the right
to send unsolicited mail, the court may face the tedious task of balancing the business's right to freedom of
speech with the individual's right of privacy.
{23} Fundamental rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute guarantees; therefore, "the right of
every person 'to be left alone' must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate."[77]
Traditionally, courts have vigorously protected freedom of speech. The argument, however, can be made that
a spammer's right to communicate would not be unduly burdened by a restriction on unsolicited mass e-mails
because effective alternative means of communication are available.[78]For example, spammers may
advertise through use of online bulletin boards, the World Wide Web, postal mail, telemarketing, and
newspapers.[79] Considering the alternative means of advertising available, ISP subscribers should not be
forced to accept unwanted e-mail. Additionally, because the survival of Internet service providers is
dependent upon the volume of their membership, they should not lose business when adequate alternatives
exist which could lessen the burden on them and their subscribers.
{24} This discussion merely illustrates the analysis that the courts would undergo if ISPs were state actors.
Notwithstanding the above discussion, spammers cannot rely on freedom of speech as an effective defense
because ISPs are not state actors.[80]
{25} If challenged in court, statutes which attempt to regulate spam will survive judicial scrutiny. If federal
and state legislatures enact a statute to regulate spam, courts will use the Central Hudson/Fox standard of
scrutiny to analyze the validity of the challenged statute.[81] Spammers might argue that most unsolicited e-
mail messages neither mislead[82] nor advertise illegal activity. The government interest in protecting the
privacy of ISP customers, preserving the integrity of the Internet, and minimizing the burden on ISPs'
computer systems may not be considered substantial enough to outweigh the right to freedom of commercial
speech. Moreover, government regulation must be narrowly tailored and directly advance a government
interest. Those are among the arguments that spammers may assert, perhaps with little chance of success, to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute regulating or prohibiting spam. If challenged, the state or federal
statute will face some difficult hurdles before the courts will declare it a valid restriction of commercial
speech. The proposed bills discussed in Part V of this article may be scrutinized under the Central
Hudson/Fox standard if they are challenged in court.[83]
III. Other Defenses Asserted by Spammers
A. Essential Facilities Defense
{26} In addition to the free speech defense discussed above, spammers have asserted an essential facilities
defense. The essential facilities doctrine states that "a business or group of businesses which controls a scarce
facility has an obligation to give competitors reasonable access to it."[84] Spammers contend that ISPs
control a scarce facility; as such, spammers argue that they, as competitors, have the right to reasonable
access of the essential facility.[85] One court, however, already has determined that ISPs are not essential
facilities.[86]
{27} In America Online, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,[87] AOL implemented blocking software to which
Cyber Promotions objected. The new software is designed to prevent AOL's subscribers from receiving e-
mail from a sender whose e-mail address has been put on a list of domain names and Internet Protocol
addresses maintained by AOL. AOL places spammers on this list if they have been the subject of complaints
by AOL subscribers and if they have refused to stop sending spam. Cyber Promotions contended that the use
of this software violates federal antitrust laws because AOL is an "essential facility," which requires it to
allow its competitors to have reasonable access to its facilities. Ruling that AOL was not an essential facility,
the court denied Cyber Promotions' motion for preliminary injunction against use of this blocking software.
[88]
{28} The driving force behind the "essential facilities" doctrine is the desire to prevent monopolies. Normally
when a company attains monopoly or oligopoly power, there is cause for public concern because that
company serves a substantial part of the general public. Courts must look at the good or service provided, the
threat of competition, and the presence of government regulation.[89] To be a monopoly, the business entity
must have a monopoly power, which necessarily includes the power to set higher than competitive prices for
the goods or services. AOL, however, does not have the privilege of charging its subscribers monopoly prices
because other competitors are present in the market. If AOL were to charge more than the competition, its
subscribers would switch to another Internet service provider. Furthermore, AOL clearly does not enjoy
monopoly power because of the availability of many competitive ISPs, such as CompuServe, Erols, Prodigy,
and Microsoft Network, as well as local ISPs. Subscribers to any of these ISPs may switch freely from one
service provider to another. In addition, new competitors can easily gain entry into this market with only a
small amount of capital. Consequently AOL, by supplying e-mail access, does not maintain sufficient control
of the market to constitute monopoly power.[90]
{29} The "essential facilities" defense fails for another reason: ISPs and spammers are not competitors. ISPs
provide their subscribers with Internet access. Spammers advertise various goods and services. The fact that
spammers advertise via e-mail messages does not place them in competition with ISPs. Rather, spammers
rely on the service provided by these ISPs in order to send their unsolicited advertisements via e-mail.
Spammers and Internet service providers can be considered competitors only in the sense that they hold
opposing positions with respect to unsolicited e-mails. Spammers want to continue sending unsolicited e-
mails, whereas Internet service providers want to prohibit them. A spammer's true competitor would be
another entity that engaged in the business of providing advertising via e-mail.
B. Public Utility Defense
{30} Spammers have also put forth a public utility defense. To be classified as a public utility, ISPs must
meet three elements. First, they must possess an essential good or service to which the general public has a
legal right to demand or receive; second, the service must be provided indiscriminately; third, its business of
providing the service must concern the public.[91] The public utility defense fails for two reasons. First,
providing Internet access is not an essential service because there are alternative channels of communication
that a company can use to send unsolicited advertisements, such as television, the United States mail and
newspapers. Second, the court will consider whether the ISP maintains a monopolistic or oligopolistic
position with regard to providing Internet access. As previously stated, commercial online computer services
are not monopolies or oligopolies.[92]
{31} Applying the above analysis, the court in CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. held that
CompuServe was not a public utility.[93] Consequently, Cyber Promotions did not have a legal right to
demand use of CompuServe's computer services. The court determined that CompuServe did not provide an
essential service because there were alternative modes of communication available to the general public. The
court further pointed out that CompuServe's services are not readily used by the general population.[94]
Therefore, CompuServe was not a public utility.
IV. Judicial Developments
A. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Apex Global Information Services, Inc.
{32} In addition to CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.[95] and America Online, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc.,[96] discussed above, this section will review several subsequent cases. In Cyber
Promotions, Inc. v. Apex Global Information Services, Inc.,[97] the court faced a different type of spamming
issue than in the previous cases. In that case, the court enforced a contract entered into between Cyber
Promotions and Apex Global Information Services, Inc. ("Apex"), an Internet Service Provider ("ISP"). Apex
contracted to provide Cyber Promotions with access to the Internet. Apex knew that Cyber Promotions was in
the business of sending unsolicited e-mail advertisements. Moreover, Apex agreed not to terminate Cyber
Promotions subscription without thirty days' notice. Cyber Promotions' advertising techniques ultimately
consumed a large portion of Apex's computer resources; consequently, Cyber Promotions' subscription was
terminated without thirty days' notice. Accordingly, Cyber Promotions filed suit for breach of contract.[98]
{33} The court held that Cyber Promotions' claim for breach of contract was valid and enjoined Apex from
terminating Cyber Promotions' subscription.[99] The court noted that, although unsolicited e-mail messages
are undesirable, and that Cyber Promotions' actions are controversial, "the fact that Cyber [Promotions] is an
unpopular citizen of the Internet does not mean that Cyber [Promotions] is not entitled to have its contracts
enforced in a court of law."[100] The court knew that reactivation of Cyber Promotions' subscription would
result in great damage to Apex, Apex's clients, and to other Internet users, but the court blamed Apex's
conduct for its decision.[101] Knowing the nature of Cyber Promotions' business, Apex freely contracted not
to terminate Cyber Promotions' subscription without thirty days' notice. Apex subsequently terminated Cyber
Promotions' subscription without the required notice. Given these facts, the court had no choice but to
reactivate Cyber Promotions' subscription because there was a clear breach of contract.
B. People v. Lipsitz
{34} People v. Lipsitz[102] is different from almost all other Internet cases because it was filed in the
Supreme Court of New York County, as opposed to a federal court. Therefore, in dealing with the
jurisdictional issue, the court held that it could hear the case because the spammer was selling magazine
subscriptions in the state of New York via e-mail through a local ISP.[103] Moreover, the spammer was
physically located in New York and the acts complained of occurred in New York.
{35} Kevin Jay Lipsitz, a magazine salesperson, advertised subscriptions to various magazines by sending
mass e-mails to New York residents. Lipsitz falsified the return address on those e-mails so that they could
not be traced back to him. The contents of the e-mails were also false. The messages indicated that they were
written by a satisfied customer and that subscriptions were obtained by referral and not by solicitation. In
actuality, those who subscribed never received their magazines or received them for only a portion of the
subscription term.[104]
{36} The court's holding was specific to the facts of this case and cannot be applied broadly. The court
enjoined Lipsitz's actions based on a charge of false advertising and on a charge of operating under an unfiled
business name.[105] Surprisingly, however, the court held that falsifying the return address of an e-mail
message was merely a method "designed to inspire confidence" in the content of the e-mail.[106]
D. Parker v. C.N. Enterprises
{37} In Parker v. C.N. Enterprises,[107] C.N. Enterprises ("C.N.") sent unsolicited e-mail messages using
Tracy Parker's domain name as the return address. Many of the e-mails that were sent had invalid addresses
and were returned to Parker's address because C.N. was using her domain name. As a result, Parker and her
Internet service provider, Zilker Internet Park, Inc. ("Zilker"), filed suit against C.N.[108]
{38} The court permanently enjoined C.N. from sending unsolicited e-mail using Parker's domain name.
[109] The court reasoned that C.N.'s actions amounted to a trespass and nuisance because it was not entitled
to the use of Parker's domain name.[110] Surprisingly, the court enjoined C.N. from sending unsolicited e-
mail using any other domain name without express permission from the owner of that domain name.[111]
Furthermore, the court found that C.N.'s actions "inflicted substantial harm [on Parker and Zilker], including
substantial service disruptions, lost access to communications, lost time, lost income and lost opportunities."
[112] C.N. also caused harm to Zilker's system, which was temporarily disabled from the exhaustion of its
processing and storage facilities.[113]
{39}Countless other complaints have been filed against spammers, some of which are pending in court,[114]
and some of which have been settled out of court. Until legislation is enacted restricting the intrusiveness of
spam, many more complaints will be filed against spammers in the future.
V. Legislative Developments
A. Federal Legislation
{40} The courts' trend to enjoin spamming may have spurred federal and state legislatures to action.
Legislators have introduced many bills in Congress, but none have been enacted. Because the Internet is a
"decentralized, global medium of communications,"[115] a federal statute would be more effective in
regulating spam than disparate and varied state statutes.
{41} Currently, Congress is considering seven bills purporting to regulate unsolicited e-mail. None of the
bills proposes to ban completely the use of e-mail as a method of unsolicited communications. On the other
hand, all seven bills require that the unsolicited e-mail contain the sender's name, street address, telephone
number, and e-mail address.[116] That provision is important for two reasons. First, the provision would
allow the recipient to identify the spammer, so that innocent third parties will not be blamed for the actions of
spammers, as in Parker v. C.N. Enterprises.[117] Second, the provision would allow effective use of filtration
software implemented by ISPs, which would be able to identify and block certain domain names. However,
knowledge of the spammer's e-mail address would prove more helpful to the ISPs, especially if the spammer
is required to honor a recipient's request to be removed from the spammer's mailing list. Only one of the
seven pending bills does not require spammers to honor a recipient's request to terminate further
communication.[118]
{42}A couple of the pending bills have distinct provisions worth noting. House Bill 4124 contains a
provision that makes it unlawful for any person to send an unsolicited commercial e-mail message to
subscribers of an Internet service provider if the spammer "know[s] or [has] reason to know that such action
is in contravention of the rules of the interactive computer service."[119] This bill places the burden on the
ISP to establish a policy prohibiting spam. If the ISP lacks such a policy, then the spammer cannot be held
accountable for his actions.
{43} Senate Bill 771 has two important features. First, this bill requires that spamming parties label each
unsolicited commercial e-mail an "Advertisement."[120] Secondly, the bill states that upon subscriber
demand, the Internet service provider has to implement a filtration software that blocks the subscriber's
receipt of e-mails which have the word "Advertisement" in the subject line of the message.[121] This bill
differs from other bills because, in addition to imposing a duty on the spammer, it also imposes a burden on
the recipient's Internet service provider to filter incoming e-mail messages.
B. State Legislation
1. State Legislation Passed
{44} Only a handful of states have passed legislation to regulate spamming. The problem with state
regulation of spam is that the application of the statute has jurisdictional boundaries. Consequently, spammers
who have no connection to the states of California, Nevada, or Washington will not be affected by the
regulations of those state statutes.
{45} Assembly Bill 1629 was passed by the California Legislature on August 27, 1998.[122] Like House Bill
4124 discussed above, Assembly Bill 1629 imposes the burden of regulating spam on the individual Internet
service providers. The bill does not require spammers to include their name, street address, telephone
number, and electronic mail address on each unsolicited e-mail as required by all seven bills currently
pending in Congress. Rather, Assembly Bill 1629 prohibits an ISP's subscriber from using such service
provider's equipment to transmit unsolicited e-mail if the ISP's published policy forbids such actions.[123] In
addition, the legislation requires that no person receive permission to use the equipment of an Internet service
provider in the dissemination of unsolicited e-mails if the service provider's published policy forbids such
actions.[124] Accordingly, Assembly Bill 1629 imposed two burdens on ISPs. First, they have a burden to
established and publish a policy against unsolicited e- mail. Second, they have the burden to bring suit if a
spammer has violated their published policy.
{46} Assembly Bill 1629 may not be an effective remedy in the fight against spam given the past actions of
spammers. Most ISPs have published policies that prohibit the use of their equipment to disseminate
unsolicited e-mail. Those policies have not thwarted the actions of many spammers. For example, Cyber
Promotions continued to send spam to AOL's subscribers even though AOL has an explicit policy against
spamming. In fact, Cyber Promotions continued to send spam even after AOL had requested that they stop.
Assembly Bill 1629 has done nothing to increase a recipient's ability to choose whether or not he or she
wants to receive unsolicited e-mails.[125] Part VII of this article will suggest that government regulation put
the power of control in the hands of ISP subscribers.
{47} Nevada was the first state to pass a bill regulating spam, Senate Bill 13, which became effective July 1,
1998. This bill is similar to House Bill 1748 in that it prohibits the transmission of unsolicited e-mail
messages unless the sender has a preexisting business relationship with the recipient.[126] Absent such a
relationship, the spammer may send an unsolicited e-mail only if the message can be identified as an
advertisement and only if the message includes the sender's name, address, electronic mail address, and
instructions on how to remove the recipient's name and e-mail address from future mailing lists.[127] This
bill differs from California's Assembly Bill 1629. Senate Bill 13, under most circumstances, allows the
recipient of spam to retain control over what he or she blocks.
{48} Finally, the State of Washington passed a bill regulating spam on March 25, 1998, which became
effective June 11, 1998. House Bill 2752 prohibits a person or other entity from sending unsolicited e-mail
messages that contain a false return address or that contain incorrect information as to the origin of the e-
mail.[128] The bill further provides that a person or other entity cannot use a third person's domain name
without that person's permission.[129] In addition, the bill states that the subject line of an unsolicited e-mail
cannot have falsified or misleading information.[130] Of the three bills passed by state legislatures,
Washington's House Bill 2752 gives e-mail recipients the most control over whether or not they wish to
receive spam.[131]
{49} Several other states are proposing to regulate spam. Some states that have bills regulating spam pending
in their respective state legislatures include Alaska,[132] Kentucky,[133] Maryland,[134] Massachusetts,
[135] New Jersey,[136] New York,[137] North Carolina,[138] Rhode Island,[139] Virginia,[140] and
Wisconsin.[141] Of the ten states that have proposed bills to regulate spam, Alaska, Kentucky, North
Carolina, and New York would require the spammer to provide information identifying it as the sender.
Moreover, the bills proposed by those four states would require that spammers allow the recipients an option
to decline receipt of future spam. Alaska, North Carolina and New York also require the spammer to identify
the message as an advertisement. Some states, such as Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin, have proposed legislation that would prohibit the dissemination of unsolicited advertisements
via e-mail. If those prohibitions against spam pass their legislatures, affected spammers undoubtedly will
challenge the constitutionality of the statutes in court. At that time, the court will have to apply the Central
Hudson/Fox standard of scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of any statutes prohibiting or regulating
spam.[142]
{50} Conversely, three other states rejected bills regulating spam. Colorado enacted House Bill 1284,[143]
but before its enactment, the state legislature deleted the provision regulating spam.[144] The amended bill
only regulates fax solicitations. Connecticut proposed a bill to prohibit spam, but its senate never took action
on it.[145] New Hampshire also proposed a bill regulating spam, but the bill died in New Hampshire's house.
[146]
{51} Both federal and state lawmakers have taken note of problems associated with spam: spam-related
litigation has encouraged those lawmakers to act. Although effective regulations against spam still are
lacking, it almost is certain that some regulation will be enacted within the coming years.
VI. Legal Theories Used By Internet Service Providers
A. Trespass to Chattel
{52} Legislative regulation is currently unavailable to ISPs who do not conduct business in California,
Nevada or Washington. As such, most ISPs still must rely on the judicial system to enjoin spamming. Several
claims can be brought against a spammer.
{53} The first claim is trespass to chattels. The Internet is still emerging as a widely used tool of
communication; consequently, few laws currently govern trespass in cyberspace. The crime of trespass to
chattel requires an overt act with the intent to interfere with a chattel in the possession of another, thereby
resulting in actual damages to the chattel. "Thus[,] it is a trespass to damage goods or destroy them, [or] to
make an unpermitted use of them."[147] Presently, "computer hacking" is considered to be a form of trespass.
[148] Computer hacking occurs when a person intentionally gains access to another's computer system
without authorization.
{54} Many ISPs have filed suit against spammers alleging trespass to chattel. These ISPs allege that
spammers have intentionally, and without authorization, used the service providers' equipment to disseminate
unsolicited e-mail messages that impaired the ISPs' equipment and deprived their subscribers of the
legitimate use of their equipment.[149] The claim that spamming is a trespass appears to be gaining
legitimacy. The court in CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.[150] granted the Internet service
provider a preliminary injunction based partially on the theory of trespass. Moreover, the court in Parker v.
C.N. Enterprises[151] ruled for the plaintiffs on their trespass claim.
B. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
{55} ISPs also have used the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFSA") as a vehicle for their complaints
against spammers. [152] In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) prohibits a person from "knowingly
caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code, or command to a computer or computer system."
[153] This prohibition applies to a person who intends the transmission to "damage, or cause damage to, a
computer, computer system, network, information, data, or program; or . . . withhold or deny, or cause the
withholding or denial, of the use of a computer, computer services, system or network, information, data or
program."[154] In addition, the transmission must occur "through means of a computer used in interstate
commerce or communications" and without the ISP's authorization.[155] And finally, the Code provides that
the damage to the Internet service provider for any one year period must aggregate at least $1,000.[156]
{56} Spam can have the effect of disabling a computer system because "[h]igh volumes of junk e-mail
devour computer processing and storage capacity [and] slow down data transfer between computers over the
Internet by congesting the electronic paths through which the messages travel."[157] The congestion of the
computer system would deny both ISPs and their subscribers use of the system. Mass volumes of spam can
also cause damage to the ISP's computer system because most service providers have mail systems which
have a finite capacity to process and store e-mail. Accordingly, "[t]he mail system is not designed to
accommodate, and it is vulnerable to disruption by, indiscriminate mass mailings from . . . senders of
unsolicited commercial e-mail."[158] Consequently, the ISP will not face a problem in proving damages.
{57} Even though ISPs have the arduous burden of proving damages, they also have the more difficult
burden of proving that the spammer intended to cause the damage as stated in the above paragraph. In light of
the recent and abundant controversy regarding spam, however, it may be difficult for a spammer to deny that
its actions resulted in damages to the ISP's computer system.
C. False Designation of Origin
{58} Several claims are available to an ISP whose domain name was used falsely by the spammer as its
electronic return address. One such claim falls under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). This code section prohibits
any person from:
us[ing] in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which [A] is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person . . . .[159]
{59} Generally, ISPs do not want to be associated with spam, much less the product or service that is being
advertised.[160] The majority of the population who communicates via electronic mail abhors spam;
therefore, ISPs do not want to portray the image that they tolerate spam in any sense. As such, ISPs and other
plaintiffs argue that when a spammer uses the service provider's domain name in the electronic return address
of the unsolicited e-mail, such usage not only causes confusion but also leads the recipient to believe that the
ISP tolerates, condones, or endorses the spammer's advertised product or service or that the ISP is somehow
"affiliated, connected or associated"[161] with the spammer. Those beliefs by the recipient can damage the
name and reputation of the ISP and other third-party plaintiffs, whose domain name is being used is spam.
{60} Additionally, ISPs have several others claims of which they may avail themselves. Several ISPs have
filed suit alleging dilution of interest in service mark pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), violation of the
Electronic Communications Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2701, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and
misappropriation of name and identity.
{61} Although an ISP has several avenues with which to seek relief in a court of law, relief is not certain. So
far, courts have been sympathetic to the plaintiffs, which necessarily includes ISPs, but an injunction is not
guaranteed and the judicial process is slow. Several of the cases, particularly those involving Cyber
Promotions, have resulted in settlement. For the moment, however, most ISPs have no choice but to rely on
the courts to enjoin the actions of spammers.
VII. Recommendation
{62} Although commercial online computer service providers and other plaintiffs have prevailed in court,
these are small victories. These plaintiffs may not be as fortunate with the next spammer who comes along.
The court must make a case-by-case determination of whether a wrong has been committed and whether the
spammer will be allowed to continue its practice. To avoid the uncertainty of a case-by-case determination,
government regulation is needed. The fight against spam cannot be fought by the private online services
alone. These entities have tried sending letters to the spammers requesting them to stop, implemented
blocking software, written explicit prohibitions against spamming in their contractual agreement with
members, and even sent "e-mail bombs". These attempts, however, will not be successful without the help of
government regulation. Moreover, "the online giant[s] [ are] increasingly taking [their] cases to the court
system, where judges have been sympathetic so far."[162] This increasing reliance on litigation to resolve the
matter is backing up court dockets. The government should stop dragging its feet and step up to the plate to
relieve the courts of some of the burden of deciding spamming cases. Although legislation has been
proposed, none have been passed.
{63} As discussed in Part II.D of this article, although a complete ban on sending unsolicited commercial
advertisements via e-mail may not survive the intermediate standard of review, less drastic governmental
regulations could be imposed. As one court has stated, "the Internet is one of those areas of commerce that
must be marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most
extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet altogether."[163] This is a result that no one wants to
see. In drafting regulations, the government should look to the settlement that took place between AOL and
Cyber Promotions on January 31, 1997, which allows AOL subscribers to choose whether or not they want to
receive unsolicited e-mail.[164]
{64} Consequently, the best solution may be to increase user control and decrease governmental regulation.
Because the Internet is already a decentralized medium of communication, an increase in user control may
reduce the need for government regulation.[165] A reduction in governmental regulation does not mean a
complete lack of governmental regulation. User control requires: "(1) [a] means of identifying the content
being transmitted, and (2) the ability of the user to screen out certain kinds of content."[166] Blocking
software is useless if the header of an e-mail message is disguised. To allow users of the Internet to control
materials that enter their e-mail boxes, the government needs to impose a regulation prohibiting spammers
from falsifying the return address of the unsolicited e-mail message.[167] If the return address is incorrect,
then the receiver is unable to send a response e-mail requesting that his or her e-mail address be deleted from
the spammer's mailing list, thereby inhibiting user control.
{65} That was the approach taken in the settlement agreement between Americal Online and Cyber
Promotions on January 31, 1997. The settlement is a relief for Cyber Promotions, which was denied a
temporary restraining order on AOL's use of its blocking and filtration software on November 26, 1996.[168]
The court also granted summary judgment on November 4, 1996, on Cyber Promotions' First Amendment
claim.[169] The settlement imposes an obligation on both AOL and Cyber Promotions. Cyber Promotions
can use only a limited number of domains from which it can send unsolicited e-mail advertisements.[170]
The imposition of this limitation will allow AOL subscribers effectively to block e-mails that are derived
from certain domain names.[171]
{66} In the past, Cyber Promotions averted this blocking tool by frequently changing its domain names. On
the other hand, AOL is obligated to inform its subscribers that the blocking software allows them to choose to
receive unsolicited e-mails.[172] Subscribers have the option to unblock those domain names from which
they want to receive unsolicited e-mails. Both AOL and Cyber Promotions have referred to this settlement as
a victory. Stanford Wallace, President of Cyber Promotions, stated that "'[t]his was a business model that we
were considering . . . . This way we know the mail is going to people who want it.'"[173] Furthermore, David
Phillips, associate general counsel of AOL, proclaimed that "'[t]his decision is a big win for AOL members
because it puts them in control of their email. They can still receive Cyber Promotions junk email if they
want.'"[174] Some of the bills proposed by Congress do require that spammers provide recipients with their
electronic return address. To this day, however, none of these bills have been passed.
{67} In addition, the government should impose a law that requires the senders of unsolicited commercial
advertisements to accurately label the nature of their communication. Essentially, this requirement demands
that the word "Advertisement" be included in the subject line of the electronic mail message. Only one of the
bills proposed by Congress, Senate Bill 771, required the spammer to label their unsolicited message as an
"Advertisement."[175] This requirement is needed as a secondary means by which recipients can exert
control over what they spend time reading. Undoubtedly, blocking and filtration software cannot weed out all
unsolicited e-mails. Old spammers may switch domain names or new spammers may bring in new domain
names which will not be picked up by the blocking and filtration software. Clear identification of the nature
of the e-mail will allow recipients to delete unsolicited e-mails before they spend their valuable time opening
and reading the message.
{68} Moreover, the government could restrict online services from selling profiles on their members, which
may include the subscribers' e-mail addresses, hobbies, and interests.[176] A regulation that restricts the sale
of personal information potentially would not invoke any First Amendment concerns because what is being
regulated is conduct not speech.[177] These three proposed regulations will help users of the Internet exercise
some autonomy over what they do and do not receive.
 
VIII. Conclusion
{69} The Internet can be an invaluable means of research and communication. The Internet allows people all
over the world to communicate instantly, conveniently, and cheaply. Electronic information can be
transmitted through cyberspace faster than any other means of transmission currently in existence. The future
of this magnificent network may be in jeopardy if the government does not get involved in regulating spam.
Internet users may find it more burdensome to scroll through and erase "junk e-mail" than the system is
worth.
{70} Presently, the law is clear that a business's right to send unsolicited commercial advertisements via
electronic mail is not protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution. In the near future, the only
remedy available to those who cannot benefit from California, Nevada, or Washington's spamming laws
against spam may be to bring a civil suit in a court of law. The court may be willing to declare the spamming
a trespass where the spammer ignores warning letters and evades filtration software, as it did in Parker v.
C.N. Enterprises[178] and in CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.[179] The court may be willing to
enjoin the actions of the spammers on other counts, such as a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act. Regardless of the remedies available to Internet service providers in the judicial system, it remains
necessary for legislatures to enact regulations that serves the interest of all parties involved by increasing user
control.
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